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Abstract
Although pension funds have gained importance in the last two decades, their role has not been
described in detail by economic models. This paper focusses on the scope of these institutional
investors when they are not satisﬁed with a management team of a company in which the pension
fund holds a block of shares. Stock holdings by pension funds are largely dispersed. Therefore,
any intervention by pension funds in corporate governance requires the formation of a coalition of
pension funds. The realization of a coordinated intervention, in turn, is subject to the problems
related to the provision of public goods, such as free-riding. We ﬁnd that the stock dispersion
and the combined share of pension funds, coordination costs and the attractiveness of the exit
option are relevant factors for determining the probability of the success of interventions.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate under which conditions a group of homogeneous pension funds has
a chance at forming a coalition to exert pressure on the incumbent management team.1 These
huge pension funds hold widely diversiﬁed portfolios and can never act as raiders for ﬁduciary
reasons. Their position in a single ﬁrm, albeit big from the point of view of a small shareholder,
is nevertheless usually too small to pursue costly monitoring and intervening singlehandedly.
Therefore, monitoring and intervention can only be undertaken by forming a coalition with other
pension funds. Coalitions of pension funds need ex ante a low cost-beneﬁt ratio in order to have
a chance to be successful. Our one-period model of forming the coalition is similar to Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1984) or Dixit and Olson (2000), but in contrast to these authors we do not
assume ﬁxed or even declining contribution costs per participant, but rather rising contribution
costs. This reduces the probability of a successful coalition outcome, but describes costs of
coalition procedures more precisely. Additionally, we formalise the alternative option each pension
fund has of unloading part or all of its stockholding if it is not content with a particular ﬁrm.
Whether that option is economically feasible mainly depends upon transaction costs and the rate
of reinvestment return. The defense of shareholders’ interests against dysfunctional behaviour of
managers has always been at the core of corporate governance theory. In contrast to the vast
literature on raiders and other blockholders, as far as we know the role of pension funds has not
been investigated in theoretical models yet. One reason could be that pension funds invest in a
very diversiﬁed manner and therefore very seldom appear in the public or media. Pension funds
cannot act as raiders, taking over ﬁrms, both for legal reasons and because such an action does
not fall within their purpose. Another reason is that, because of diversiﬁcation, even a sizeable
pension fund holds only a minor stake of a few percent in any one speciﬁc ﬁrm. CalPERS for
example, the large and active California public pension fund, holds about 1400 diﬀerent stocks
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and owns “between 0.5 and 2 percent of the outstanding stock for each company in its portfolio”
(Hawley and Williams, 2000) which is already at that time far above the average size of stock
holdings of pension funds. Risk considerations lead such huge pension funds to be prone to liquid
stocks, which usually also induces them to undertake only small or no monitoring eﬀorts at all.
If a stock position seems doubtful, an individual pension fund therefore can sell its stake rather
than undertake the costly eﬀorts of monitoring and intervening. But selling a stake of the size of
0.5 to 2 percent will most likely have a negative impact on the stock price. This argument applies
even more if all pensions funds want to sell the same stock at the same time.2 This individualistic
behaviour has to be viewed diﬀerently if we consider that nowadays pension funds as a group
own a sizeable portion of the stock market. In 2012 pension funds in OECD countries held
USD 21.8 trillion in assets. This compares to USD 30.0 trillion from investment funds, USD 24.5
trillion of assets from insurance companies and USD 1.9 trillion from other institutional investors.
Pension funds in OECD countries therefore have a market share of 28% of total assets managed
by institutional investors (OECD 2013). Most of the assets of pension funds are concentrated
in a few countries. USD 11.6 trillion (or 53.4% of all pension fund assets) are held by pension
funds domiciled in the United States, followed by pension funds in the United Kingdom with
assets worth USD 2.3 trillion (11%), Japan with USD 1.4 trillion (6.6%), the Australia with USD
1.4 trillion (6.5%), the Netherlands with USD 1.3 trillion (5.8%), Canada with USD 1.2 trillion
(5.5%) and Switzerland with USD 0.7 trillion (3.4%).3 If some or all pension funds wanted to
unload a displeasing stock position at the same time, the induced price drop aﬀects not only
the selling funds - through both in sold and unsold stocks - but also all other inactive pension
funds. This potential for pension funds has been recognised especially in the USA. Hawley and
Williams pointed out that institutional investors, whom they name “universal owners” (since
they own all stocks), could potentially play a prominent role with regard to corporate governance
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questions. If pension funds choose voice instead of exit it depends on their size and capability to
pose a credible threat on the management’s reputation in the public. Giant pension funds such as
the California Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS)4 or the Teachers Insurance and
Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) have enough assets under
management to undertake costly monitoring of companies by themselves, without incurring too
high costs, which would deteriorate the ratio of total operating costs.5 CalPERS and TIAA-CREF
not only do proxy voting by themselves but also undertake corporate engagement privately with
portfolio companies, when they perceive shortcomings in their governance. On the other side of
the spectrum are small and medium sized pension funds, for which monitoring of companies is
both too costly and too time-consuming. Corporate governance became an economic and political
issue for bigger public or private pension funds in the 80s and 90s of the last century. In order to
conﬁne costs within reasonable limits, bigger pension funds started alone or in small groups to
monitor companies and shared the analysis with other pension funds, which participated in the
accruing costs. Prime examples for this historical process of coalition building of pension funds
are Hermes and Ethos.
The market for corporate control, in turn, may be subject to ineﬃciencies (Grossman and Hart,
1980), since raids are costly and atomistic investors will free-ride on the actions of the raider,
i.e. not tender the shares, in order to enjoy the improvement in the ﬁrm.6 As Olson showed
in 1965, the free-rider problem becomes more severe, the higher the number of private parties
necessary for the production of the public good. And the bigger the free-rider problem, the less
likely it is that the public good will be produced by private parties, which have to voluntarily
form a coalition. Palfrey and Rosenthal in 1984 ﬁrst presented a formal model for calculating the
probability of the production of the public good. Dixit and Olson in 2000 use a similar model,
but they assume that total contribution costs are ﬁxed, whereas Palfrey and Rosenthal assume
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that the contribution of each participant is constant, independent of the number of cooperative
parties. In our paper we also use the Palfrey and Rosenthal approach, but we assume that total
contribution costs rise with the number of participants. The assumption of rising costs in our
model is very plausible, since coordination of opinions and actions is more complex and costly the
higher the number of parties involved and the less informed potential participants of a coalition
are.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we summarize and discuss brieﬂy related
empirical ﬁndings. In Section 3, we examine under which circumstances a coordinated eﬀort of
pension funds has a chance of being successful. It will be shown that the formation of a winning
coalition will be more likely when pension funds have a higher concentration of stocks of the
targeted company. In the fourth section we investigate the case of pension funds using the “exit”
option by selling the speciﬁc stock. Depending upon the size of the “market impact”, e.g. the
price decline of the sold stock, the ﬁnancial result of both courses of action can be compared.
In Section 5 we conclude and discuss the results of the preceding two sections in the context of
current thinking on corporate governance issues and propose further research opportunities. In
the concluding section we show possible implications for pension funds and policy makers.
2 Empirical findings
Critical views claim that pension funds would not be speciﬁcally qualiﬁed to take on the role of
monitoring ﬁrms operating in diﬀerent industrial environments, and therefore should concentrate
only on their role as ﬁduciaries for their clientele of active contributors and retirees. In an early
empirical paper, Smith (1996) investigated the approach and success of CalPERS (California
Public Employees Retirement System), the largest public pension fund in the United States and
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very prominent due to its monitoring of companies. Empirically, Smith found mixed results;
stocks of ﬁrms that agreed to changes proposed by CalPERS had an abnormal positive return
of +1 percent, while stocks of resisting ﬁrms had an average negative return of -1 percent. But
operating proﬁts of targeted ﬁrms did not improve after intervention by CalPERS. Activism for
the portfolio of CalPERS though showed positive results. After reviewing a wide set of em-
pirical studies with regard to the eﬀectiveness of pension funds’ monitoring, Prevost and Rao
(2000) conclude that results are mixed. No positive eﬀect could be proven for both the operating
performance and the stock performance of targeted ﬁrms. Prevost and Rao test the hypothesis
that the primary function of a proposal of a pension fund is to act as a signaling mechanism in
alerting the market that the targeted management is unwilling to negotiate a settlement with
the pension fund. Prevost and Rao ﬁnd in their event study that ﬁrms experienced negative
wealth eﬀects when targeted either by CalPERS, or by a coalition of public funds supporting
one or more proposals on the same proxy. Firms which were targeted several times by public
pension funds experienced permanent declines in market value. Some empirical studies focus not
on performance data of shares of targeted ﬁrms, but on direct eﬀects of monitoring. Faccio and
Lasfer (2000) analyse the monitoring role of occupational pension funds in the UK, and conclude
that these funds are not eﬀective monitors. Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) study shareholder
proposals of the largest, most active funds in the USA up to 1993 and ﬁnd that shareholder
proposals are followed by signiﬁcant corporate governance activity and wide corporate changes
such as asset sales and restructurings. Crespi and Renneboog (2010) investigate voting coalitions
which aim at disciplining incumbent management. They ﬁnd that Shapley values capturing the
relative power of shareholder coalitions outperform models with percentage ownership stakes.
Other authors such as Barber (2007) point out that an additional conﬂict of interest could arise
when pension funds engage in institutional activism.7 In our setting we only investigate the case
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of shareholder activism, which covers situations where pension fund managers want to increase
shareholder value of ﬁrms or to impede at least a decline. The model we present below relates
to the latter while the former can be considered as a symmetric case. It is known since decades
that the increase of disperse and the decline of active ownership can create problems not only
for concerned (speciﬁc) ﬁrms but for the market system as a whole. This problem is closely
connected with the amount of monitoring and coordinating costs and therefore is directly tied to
diﬀerent compulsory settings, which strongly inﬂuence these costs. In 1992 the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) relaxed the conditions under which shareholders could commu-
nicate during a proxy contest. This reform lowered communications costs and thereby encouraged
shareholder coordination. Choi (2000) ﬁnds that nontraditional sponsors such as unions or reli-
gious organizations increasingly acted as a sponsor of proxy issue proposals thereby undertaking
”social activism” in Barber’s (2007) terms. But Choi (2000) also found that companies with a
high stockholding of managers or other insiders were also more often targeted.
Overall Choi (2000) ﬁnds that legal barriers to shareholder communications should undergo fur-
ther liberalization. Many empirical studies have shown that ”the main activist tool, Rule 14a-8
shareholder proxy proposals is weak and ineﬀective in eliciting change and improving performance
of target ﬁrms” (Del Guercio et al. 2008), mainly due to high monitoring and coordinating costs.
In order to reduce the cost problem, Grundfest already in 1993 advocated so called ”just vote no”
campaigns. Here active investors do not target speciﬁc proxy issues but suggest that they and
other shareholders withhold votes in board elections in order to express their dissatisfaction with
operating performance or corporate governance issues. Del Guercio et.al., examining 112 ”just
vote no” campaigns from 1990 to 2003, ﬁnd compelling evidence, that this low-cost tool is an
eﬀective device to bring the board of directors to undertake measures such as ﬁring a weak CEO
in order to improve operating performance. If ”just vote no” campaigns are started for corporate
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governance reasons, the outcome is less clear, i.e. they ﬁnd not signiﬁcant changes in operating
performance.
The discussion of both methods - ”just vote no” or proxy issue campaigns - clearly shows that
the institutional framework determines to a large degree the amount of the incurred monitoring
and coordinating costs of possible active pensions funds and thereby heavily inﬂuences not only
the probability that such interventions are undertaken but also their success rate. Additionally,
corporate governance will be improved on average by the pure threat, since board of directors as
well as managers know, that possible intervention of active investors is more likely to be successful.
3 Model for coalition building - voice only
Due to portfolio considerations, stock holdings by pension funds are largely dispersed. Therefore,
it cannot be expected that many interventions by pension funds in corporate governance will
be accomplishable without the pension funds forming a coalition. As we will argue below, the
realisation of a coordinated intervention is subject to several characteristics strongly linked to
the problems known from public good provision such as free-riding. Essentially, free-riding may
result in a failure of the Coase Theorem as participation in the coalition is voluntary. This is
precisely the reason that pension funds may not engage in shareholder activism even though such
action may result in a pareto-superior outcome. Coase argued that given a government that
allocates property rights between parties and a court that enforces the agreed bargain, a precise
allocation of property rights and the absence of any costs of information or negotiation would
lead to a bargaining solution between two parties that internalizes any externalities between
them. Moreover, Coase extended this argument to larger groups so that in his idealised world
of zero transaction costs, eﬃcient outcomes can be achieved no matter how large the groups
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are. According to Dixit and Olson (2000), Coase did not claim that he was oﬀering a theorem,
contrary to the economic literature based on Stigler (1971) who asserted that he did. A typical
formulation of the Coase Theorem states that in the absence of transaction costs, rational parties
will necessarily achieve a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation through voluntary transactions or bargaining.
In reality however, transaction costs do matter and must be taken into account in deﬁning a
Pareto-eﬃcient outcome. Dixit and Olson (2000) further argue that if the Coase Theorem applies,
it must also be true that rational parties will conduct all those trades in private goods - and all
those bargainings which internalize externalities or provide public goods - that yield positive net
gains greater than the transaction costs of realising them. Consequently, the Coase Theorem
under transaction costs implies a marginal condition according to which rational parties will
necessarily achieve a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation through voluntary transactions or bargaining.
Olson (1965,1996) and Dixit and Olson (2000) among others have argued that the Coase Theorem
would lead in many cases to absurd conclusions as it does not take into account the number of
parties who must participate in the internalization of externalities or the provision of public
goods. The result of Pareto-ineﬃcient outcomes is therefore not only due to transaction costs
which would be covered by the modiﬁed Coase Theorem, but also to the existence of free-rider
incentives. The latter in turn are a function of population size, N , and the minimum number
of parties, M , necessary to produce a public good. We follow this line of argument based on
Dixit and Olson (2000) that the Coasian claim that a ’meeting’ of all beneﬁciaries of the public
good will achieve unanimous agreement on the provision of that public good neglects the non-
cooperative incentive to free-ride on the coalition’s eﬀort. As stated above, it is an inherent part
of the Coase Theorem that participation and agreements are voluntary. Only focussing on the
’meeting’ therefore overstates the power of the Coase Theorem and leads to an overoptimistic
view of the eﬃciency of market outcomes.
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We assume that the provision of a public good - the increase in the economic performance of the
ﬁrm under consideration - requires a minimum number of pension fundsM bearing its production
costs, withM < N . Everyone is free either to join the coalition of sizeM or to free-ride. If there is
a suﬃcient number of pension funds joining the coalition, so that the public good can be produced,
intervention takes place. Hence, each agent - each pension fund in our case - has to formulate the
probability of his participation in the coalition being pivotal or not. Obviously, the probability
of being pivotal depends on M relative to N . If N is large compared to M the probability that
one pension fund is pivotal is small, hence, each pension fund may decide in a non-cooperative
manner not to join the coalition and to free-ride. This in turn means that intervention cannot
take place because of the wide dispersion of stocks in the respective enterprise that are held by
pension funds.
In the setting we present here, each pension fund is free to join the coalition or not. Additionally,
as far as the distribution of shares of the ﬁrm under consideration is concerned, we assume an equal
distribution of shares held by pension funds (i = 1, ..., N), with αPF =
∑N
i=1 αi < 1 representing
the overall amount of shares held by the N pension funds.8 The remaining shares 1 − αPF
are held by other market participants, institutional and private investors. Moreover, we assume
that the economic performance of the ﬁrm under consideration is reﬂected by shareholder value.
Normalizing the market value of a ﬁrm to one, and assuming that the economic performance
of the ﬁrm remains at its current level with a successful intervention and is zero otherwise, the
beneﬁt of a member of the coalition, Π1, is equal to the weight of shares held by all members
joining coalition. The assumption of normalizing the market value to one and to zero if the
coalition fails to form serves as a theoretical point of reference and will be relaxed further below.
If the number of pension funds within the coalition reaches the critical level M , the intervention
is successful, the costs C of the intervention are shared within the coalition and the expected
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increase in the economic performance of the ﬁrm exhibits the characteristics of a non-excludable
public good. Although each pension fund is free in its decision to free-ride or to join the coalition,
it is known to everybody that there is no increase in shareholder value if the coalition fails to form.
Hence, the decision to free-ride is dependent upon the probability of success that the coalition
will form without the participation of the pension fund willing to free-ride. Therefore, in order
to decide whether to join the coalition or not, each pension fund has to formulate a rational
expectation of whether the coalition will be successful without its participation. There are only
two possible outcomes: success or failure. We denote by P (which is endogenous) the probability
of any pension fund i ∈ N joining the coalition. At this point, we can denote the probability of
exactly M successes in N independent Bernoulli trials, where the probability of success in each
trial reads
b(N |M,P ) = N !
M !(N −M)!P
M (1− P )N−M . (1)
From the perspective of an individual pension fund, the rational decision can be demonstrated
as follows. If there are (M − 1) or more players out of (N − 1) players, then the expected net
beneﬁt of joining the coalition (IN) from the perspective of the (N − 1)-th player amounts to
N∑
n=M
(N − 1)!
(n− 1)!((N − 1)− (n− 1))!P
n−1(1− P )(N−1)−(n−1)
[
Π1 − C
n
]
. (2)
On the other hand, if more than M of N−1 players choose IN, the (N−1)-th player could choose
OUT and free ride on the coalitions eﬀort earning an expected beneﬁt of
N−1∑
n=M
(N − 1)!
n!(N − 1− n)!P
n(1− P )N−1−nΠ1. (3)
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A mixed-strategy equilibrium requires indiﬀerence between joining the coalition and free-riding
hence equalizing the last two expressions yields
(N − 1)!
(M − 1)!((N − 1)− (M − 1))!P
M−1(1− P )(N−1)−(M−1) [Π1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
beneﬁt of choosing IN
(4)
=
N∑
n=M
(N − 1)!
(n− 1)!((N − 1)− (n − 1))!P
n−1(1− P )(N−1)−(n−1)
[
C
n
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of choosing IN
The term on the LHS in Eq.(4) means that M − 1 chose IN, hence N − 1 is pivotal. The RHS is
the cost share of the (N − 1)-th player when he chooses IN.
In aggregate M players are necessary to form a coalition. P adjusts such that any player is
indiﬀerent between joining and not joining the coalition, hence
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
N
M
⎞
⎟⎟⎠PM (1− P )N−M
∑N
n=M
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
N
n
⎞
⎟⎟⎠Pn(1− P )N−n
=
b(M |N,P )
1−B(M |N,P ) =
C
Π1M
(5)
An equilibrium implies that the shared costs among coalition members in relation to the expected
gain has to equal the conditional probability at the margin that the coalition forms. Moreover,
the cost-beneﬁt ratio on the right-hand side must be smaller than one (Π1 >
C
M ), to make the
formation of a coalition economically reasonable. Figure 1 shows the cumulative probability, Q,
that a coalition of size M will form (dashed line) as a function of P for a given N which is, not
surprisingly, increasing in P . The solid line shows the behavior of the left-hand side in Eq. (5)
which is declining in P . Formally, the left-hand side can be interpreted as a hazard rate which
answers the question of how big the variation of the probability is that there are not more than
M successes in N independent Bernoulli trials, after an inﬁnitesimally small increase in P , given
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that the probability of drawing more than M is Q = 1−B(M |N,P ). Obviously, the hazard rate
is declining from 1 to 0 as P increases from 0 to 1 (for more details see appendix).
The equilibrium probability of success is determined endogenously by Eq. (5) depending on M ,
N , Π1 and C. Since it is not possible to solve Eq. (5) analytically, we have to apply a numerical
iteration method by discretization of the probability space.9
Figure 1 about here
As previously mentioned, pension funds hold large dispersed stocks varying between 0.1% and 1%
in one ﬁrm. Therefore, no pension fund is supposed to hold a very large position in a particular
ﬁrm. Intervention costs, C, consist of two blocks: monitoring costs, O, which are assumed to
be of a given size per company and include the costs of collecting information about a speciﬁc
universe of companies and second, the coordination costs among the group of pension funds which
choose to form a coalition, εM , with ε > 0. Therefore, C can be written as10
C = O + εM (6)
With regard to the coordination costs, we assume quite an optimistic scenario as the linearity in
M suggests the collaboration among pension funds which minimizes coordination eﬀort.11 Coor-
dination costs will be rather high before a coalition has been formed and has successfully targeted
listed companies: Pension funds have to invest heavily in monitoring and coordinating activities
without being sure that they can achieve a positive eﬀect. The hurdle of high coordinating costs
can be overcome when a relatively big pension fund such as for example the pension fund of
British Telecom, which founded Hermes in 1983,12 starts monitoring on its own and afterwards
is joined by other pension funds. Ethos was founded by a coalition of two pension funds from
Geneva and quickly opened up its monitoring services to other pension funds.13 When a coali-
tion of pension funds has formed and has shown its successful presence in the ﬁeld of corporate
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governance, coordination costs will be lower, since a deﬁned product can be oﬀered.
In Table 1, we present numerical solutions for the individual probability P of joining the coalition
and the cumulative probability, Q, that at least M pension funds are willing to join the coali-
tion. Before we turn our attention to the results, we discuss the calibration of our model. The
critical level of shares necessary for a successful intervention is denoted by αcrit. Obviously αcrit
is bounded from above by 0.5. In most cases it is not necessary, however, to have a majority in
order to win a proxy vote.14 If the number of minority shareholders, for example noise traders
is big, it may well be that an αcrit far below 0.5 may be suﬃcient to win. In addition, a low
αcrit appears to be realistic, if the coalition of pension funds is able to pose a credible threat
with respect to a severe damage of the ﬁrm’s reputation on the management. Whether or not
the management fears such an attack can depend on the individual characteristics of the coali-
tion members and on the numbers of votes they can collect. Pension funds with a high public
impact would reduce αcrit substantially. As has been pointed out before, pension funds in OECD
countries have a market share of 28% of total assets managed by institutional investors, in 2012
(Pension Markets in focus, OECD 2013). If we assume that assets are evenly divided between
private and institutional investors, market share of pension funds halves to around 14%. We thus
consider αcrit to fall in between 0.1 and 0.15. As regards the individual share a pension fund
holds, we ﬁx αi indirectly by observing that the size of an eﬀective coalition is determined by
αi = αcrit/M . Hermes and Ethos report 35 and 140 members respectively which reﬂects approx-
imately a lower and an upper bound for M . For αcrit and M given, we thus calculate a range
for αi between 0.07% and 0.43%. The total number of pension funds, N , invested in the ﬁrm
under consideration is 200. Ethos charges a minimum of CHF 8’000.- for proxy voting services for
the 100 biggest Swiss companies. This amounts to 0.2 basis points or 0.002% of invested capital
of a pension fund. Additionally, administrative support at the General Assembly costs another
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0.001%, if wanted. The more labour intensive service for corporate engagement has a higher cost
of 0.4 basis points or 0.004%. As previously mentioned, the OECD reports for Switzerland that
total operating costs amount to 0.3% of total assets. If we assume that Swiss pension funds had
invested all their assets in Swiss equities and would engage not only in proxy voting but also in
corporate engagement monitoring costs amount to about 2% of total operating costs. As further
reference and as an anecdotal case, the big pension fund of the City of Zurich can serve as an
example: The pension fund manages about CHF 13.8 Bio, of which CHF 4.35 Bio or 31% are
invested in equities. Due to its size and its eﬃcient operation the fund has total operating costs
of only 0.19% of invested assets. The pension fund obtains monitoring services both form Ethos
and Hermes and discloses costs 256 000 CHF for these external services (Annual Report 2012).
Internally, another 50 000 CHF accrue to labor costs. These 300 000 CHF are a little bit higher
than 1% of total operating costs of 26.4 Bio CHF. Given this empirical evidence we ﬁx O = 0.001.
As regards ε, we face the problem that this parameter is not reported by pension funds, such that
we ﬁx ε through the plausible assumption that the cost-beneﬁt ratio of an intervention should
not exceed 5.5%, if the probability of coalition formation is high. This implies that ε = 0.00004.
As can be seen in the baseline scenario (Table 1(a)) for an individual share per pension fund
αi = 0.01%, the minimum number of funds joining the coalition is 100 out of 200. An increase in
the shares held by pension funds implies a lower M . A lower M in turn decreases the probability
that one single pension fund is pivotal for the success of the coalition and therefore diminishes
the willingness to bear the costs of the intervention. Hence, the incentive to free-ride on the
coalition’s eﬀort is higher and the probability, P , for choosing to join the coalition (c.p.) lower.
At the same time, intervention costs are decreasing implying a higher cost-beneﬁt ratio of the
coalition while a lower number of participants is needed to form a coalition. Both eﬀects increase
the probability of coalition formation Q.15
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In Table 1(b), we analyze the eﬀects of a higher αcrit. Obviously, a higher αcrit c.p. increases M
which lowers the cost-beneﬁt ratio of the intervention. Both, the increase in M and the reduction
in CΠ1M induce a lower incentive to free-ride on the coalition’s eﬀort, hence, P and Q increase. On
the one hand, a reduction in the number of shareholders who do not participate in a proxy vote
increases the chances for successful coalition formation. A reduction of αcrit due to a threat of
a severe damage on the management’s reputation reduces the probability of successful coalition
building since the incentive to free-ride is larger.
In Table 1(c), we present the eﬀects of a substantial increase in coordination costs compared to
the baseline scenario in Table 1(a). The increase in the coordination costs leaves M unaﬀected.
A higher cost-beneﬁt ratio, however, reduces the incentive for each pension fund to join the
coalition, hence P and Q are lower (see also Figures 2 and 3).
Table 1 about here
Figure 2 about here
Figure 3 about here
Coordination cost are surely an important factor inﬂuencing the probability of coalition formation
but it is obviously not the only one. We thus analyze now the eﬀect of an increase in the cost-
beneﬁt ratio through a reduction in net beneﬁts. So far, we assumed that the value of the ﬁrm
drops to zero, if the intervention fails, which is the most extreme assumption possible. In Table
1(d), we relax this assumption and consider the case in which the value of the ﬁrm drops only for
20% if the coalition fails to form. Due to the increase in the cost-beneﬁt ratio the incentive to join
the coalition is reduced and the probabilities of coalition formation are lower. If the individual
share a pension fund holds is low, the probability of coalition formation may even approach zero.
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Given the economic rationality of incentives to free-ride, we isolated three reasons which may be
responsible for the failure of an intervention. A wide stock dispersion of pension funds reduces
stock concentration in each ﬁrm which increases coordination costs since more members are
necessary to form a coalition. High coordination costs lower the economic incentive to join
the coalition and decrease the probability that one single pension fund is pivotal. Second, the
higher the amount of other market participants, the smaller is the minimum size of the coalition,
which again increases the individual incentive to free ride. Additionally, since the coalition is
smaller in size, the beneﬁt Π1, which can be internalized is smaller and therefore the cost-beneﬁt
ratio deteriorates more. Finally, a cost-beneﬁt ratio surpassing a value of 0.25 in fact raises
the probability, P , for choosing to join the coalition, but nevertheless the probability of coalition
formation, Q, drastically diminishes to 6% Since monitoring costs are generally ﬁxed, intervention
costs could only be reduced by economizing on coordination costs, for example in a more eﬃcient
institutional setting such as delegated votes.
4 Exit option
Pension funds, which do not participate in the coordinated eﬀort to improve a speciﬁc ﬁrm have
two possible choices: They can hold on to the shares of the speciﬁc ﬁrm and thereby hope to
free-ride on the actions of the coordinating pension funds, or they can sell their shares in that
speciﬁc ﬁrm in order to reinvest the proceeds in the stock market. Because of the equilibrium
condition between participation in the coordinated eﬀort and free riding, these two possibilities
yield ex ante the same return. This outcome has to be compared with the situation where a
speciﬁc pension fund uses an exit strategy and sells part or all of its stock position, αi. We
assume that the pension fund holds a widely diversiﬁed portfolio and therefore does not have to
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consider the risk impact of his decision to sell the speciﬁc stock. We further assume that stocks
of this speciﬁc ﬁrm only yield a return of 0, when no intervention is undertaken, whereas the
(opportunity) return of (re-)investing in the stock market is ΠS . A pension fund will sell as many
stocks as possible, as long as the marginal return on the reinvestment exceeds transaction costs.
Transaction costs consist of commissions, bid/ask spread, market impact, and opportunity costs.
A commission is the charge paid to the broker (and eventually also to the stock exchange) and is
usually the smallest part of the transaction costs (Grinold and Kahn). The costs for the bid/ask
spread and the market impact (by how much the price is moved away from the price before the
trade started) depend upon the liquidity of the stock and the size of the trade: The less liquid the
stock and the bigger the trade are, the higher the market impact cost will be. The opportunity
cost are the costs which would be incurred if the pension fund would not undertake the trade.
Therefore, the pension fund could not reinvest the cash and the opportunity costs represent the
foregone opportunity returns. Empirically, commission costs are easiest to measure. Berkowitz,
Logue and Noser (1988) report average commission costs of 0.18% of principal value for stock
trades at the NYSE. Due to competition and computerization, commission costs have been further
reduced. Bikker, Spierdijk and van der Sluis (2007) analyze trades of the Dutch pension fund ABP
and report commissions of only 0.12%. They also measure market impact costs for the trading
activity of this big institutional investor and report impact costs of 0.2% for buys and 0.3%
for sells. Although their market impact costs are higher then commission costs, these numbers
must be viewed as a lower bound, since the analyzed trades are not motivated by the will to
actively exploit economically relevant information concerning corporate governance, but only for
the motive to rebalance the portfolio in a passive manner: Rebalancing trades, slight adjustments
of portfolio weights by buying or selling smaller portion of stocks are undertaken when portfolio
weights over time deviate from optimal ones. Trades of active institutional investors, which are
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based on active information, i.e. that the stock price is over- or undervalued, have a much higher
market impact on stock prices.
When other market participants, such as brokers, specialists or other blockholders recognize (by
viewing the oﬀered volume) that the fund wants to unload its position in a speciﬁc stock, they
will suspect that the pension fund has superior information and so additional stocks will only be
bought at progressively lower prices.16
We model therefore market impact costs m, (1 ≤ m ≤ 2− k) increasing steadily with trading size
(s). k represents commission costs and is set to 0.1%. The net proceeds of selling a portion of
that speciﬁc stock then amount to
sαi(1 − k − (ms − 1)) = sαi(2− k −ms) (7)
Market impact is highest when a pension fund wants to unload all its stocks (s=1) and the
liquidity of the market is extremely low (m = 2− k). In this case, the stock price drops to zero.
The pension fund will reinvest the net proceeds in the stock market. We assume that the pension
fund will use the proceeds by investing proportionally in all the stocks of its portfolio in order to
get the average return of the stock market, ΠS . This buy trade only incurs brokerage costs of
k for the following two reasons: First, the buy tickets are smaller and second, the counterparty
does not suspect an information asymmetry, since the volume of trades in this case is relatively
small. It is now proﬁtable for the pension fund to sell its shares of the “lemon” company and buy
the market portfolio as long as as the full trading costs, primarily the continuously rising market
impact costs on the sale side are still lower than the expected gain of improving the portfolio.
The return on the reinvestment, Γ is
Γ = ΠS(1− k)sαi(2− k −ms) (8)
It should be noted that this return on reinvestment represents ex ante, that is, before the pension
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fund has taken its decisions, the opportunity costs of the other two options of either joining the
coordinated eﬀort or not doing anything and free-riding. By taking the derivative of ΠS with
respect to s in equation (8), we derive the ﬁrst order conditions for an optimal fraction s, to be
sold by the pension fund
ΠS(1− k)αi(2− k −ms)−ΠS(1− k)s2αims−1) = 0 (9)
By solving equation (9) for s, we get s∗, the optimal fraction of stocks to be sold:
s∗ = (2− k −m)1/2 (10)
The lower the market impact m, the more it is proﬁtable for the pension fund to use the exit
strategy and sell the number of shares given by equation (10). The size of the market impact m
will be determined by a number of factors: The higher αi, the fraction of the ﬁrm in possession of
the pension fund, and the lower the so-called “free ﬂoat” - the shares which are held by other non
blockholding investors - the bigger will be the price drop when the pension fund starts to unload
a part of its shares. Additionally, if small investors or other market participants can ﬁnd out who
the seller is and if the pension fund has a good performance record in the eyes of the investing
public, the market impact will be bigger. Disclosure rules can force pension funds to declare their
trading activities when they surpass certain thresholds, so that the regulatory environment can
also impact how pension funds (and other large investors) act.
By the same rationality as described above we can derive the following equilibrium condition
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from the perspective of an individual pension fund
N∑
n=M
(N − 1)!
(n− 1)!((N − 1)− (n− 1))!P
n−1(1− P )(N−1)−(n−1)
[
Π1 − C
n
]
=
N−1∑
n=M
(N − 1)!
n!(N − 1− n)!P
n(1− P )N−1−n [(1− s)Π1 + sΠS ] . (11)
implying that
b(M |N,P )
1−B(M |N,P ) = s
∗
(
ΠS −Π1
Π1
)
+
C
Π1M
. (12)
For s∗ = 0 (no shares are sold, due to high transaction costs m), Eq. (12) is equal to Eq. (5)
without existence of an outside option. For s∗ > 0, a closer inspection of Eqs. (11) reveals that
the existence of an exit option increases the return from free-riding on the coalition’s eﬀort (see
RHS). Moreover, the right-hand side of Eq. (12) is increasing in s∗ and ΠS . Since the left-hand
side is monotonically decreasing from one to zero, the existence of an outside option lowers P
and Q.
The results are presented in Table 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c). We assume that the exit option oﬀers a
return of 5%, which corresponds to the long-term risk premium of equities. The market impact
cost m depends in practice on the individual pension fund that sells shares. If it is expected that
the selling pension fund is well informed, the market impact will be high. On the other hand, the
market impact cost depend on the type of shares that are oﬀered, i.e. the shares of small and
relatively unknown ﬁrms will suﬀer from low liquidity and thus high market impact costs. We
distinguish thus two cases with diﬀerent market impact costs: m = 1.05 and m = 1.25. Broker
cost are set to k = 0.001 which implies a fraction of sold shares of s∗ = 0.8654, if m = 1.25
and s∗ = 0.9742, if m = 1, 05. The results are presented in Table 2(a) and 2(b). Compared
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to the baseline scenario (see Table 1(a)), the cost-beneﬁt ratio in Table 2(a) has increased since
pension funds can take advantage from the exit option, which lowers both P and Q. A lower
market impact of stock selling (see Table 2(b)) increases the cost-beneﬁt ratio again which further
reduces the probabilities of coalition formation. In Table 2(c), we assume that the value of the
ﬁrm drops by only 20%, if the coalition fails to form. Lower expected losses and the existence of
the exit option drastically reduce the probability of coalition formation compared to Table 2(b)
even further. In the case of low stock holdings per pension fund (αi = 0.1%) the probability of
coalition formation is approximately zero.
5 Conclusions and discussion
Pension funds, like other institutional investors, have gained considerable weight in stock markets
in the last decades and during the same time stock ownership especially of big public corporations
has become more dispersed. In the absence of a market for corporate control and in light of the
principal-agent problem this could lead to ineﬃcient use of scarce capital not only at singular
companies but also on the macro level. In this regard, the question arises if pension funds can
enhance shareholder value by monitoring corporations and intervening in a coordinated manner
if some ﬁrms are badly managed. In this paper it is assumed that the formation of a coalition
of pension funds for monitoring purposes is costly, which induces the incentive to free ride. The
higher the incentive to free ride, which is more likely to happen when ownership is more dispersed,
the lower the probability of coalition formation. In this paper it has been shown, that
(a) a less dispersed ownership among pension funds, i.e. each pension fund holds hold a higher
portion of a singular ﬁrm, implies a lower number of pension funds necessary to form a
coalition, which raises on the one hand incentives to free ride but leads on the other hand
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to a higher cumulated probability of coalition formation, since coordination costs are lower.
(b) the higher the portion of other market participants, institutional and private investors not
participating in the vote, the smaller the minimum size of the coalition, which again in-
creases the individual incentive of a pension fund to free ride, but again raises the cumulative
probability of successful coordination, due to lower coordination costs.
(c) lower coordination costs of forming a coalition improves directly the cost-beneﬁt ratio, which
strongly raises the probability of a successful coalition.
(d) the more feasible the exit option - namely not rise the voice, but to sell the shares- the less
pension funds will undertake a coordinated eﬀort. The exit option is the more attractive,
the more liquid capital markets are, which lowers transaction costs.
While the proportion of noise traders (b) and transaction costs (d) have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
the outcome if a successful coalition can form or not, both can not be regulated by the lawmaker.
But directly and indirectly, diﬀerent compulsory settings have a strong impact on the size of
pension funds (a) and foremost on the height of coordination cost (d). The relaxation of the con-
ditions under which shareholders could communicate during a proxy contest by the SEC in 1992
led to more monitoring and coordinated eﬀorts by pension funds. Assessing the impact of theses
reforms Choi(2000) ﬁnds ”‘some support to the argument that the legal barriers to shareholder
communication should undergo further liberalization” (p. 266). In an analytic setting, this paper
shows how strongly and through which channels, legal settings inﬂuence coordination costs and
therefore the probability of success of coordinated action undertaken by pension funds in case of
single ﬁrms.
Our research is also related to the research on corporate social responsibility in the context of
pension funds as so called “universal owners”, a label coined by Hawley and Williams (2000).
22
According to them “A universal owner is a large institution that holds in its portfolio a broad
cross section of the economy, holds its shares for the long term, and does not trade except to
maintain its index”. If pension funds adopt such goals and strategies, corporate governance can
be understood as “the design of institutions that induce or force management to internalize the
welfare of stakeholders” (Tirole, 2006, p.4). This line of argumentation relates to the fact that
pension funds as ﬁnancial intermediaries do have a long time horizon with regard to their liabili-
ties, i.e. future pensions for their members and therefore should take into account intratemporal
and intertemporal externalities when they decide whether or not to closely monitor ﬁrms. If
that is achieved, pension funds would fully take on their role as “universal owners” . Hawley
and Williams hypothesise that universal owners could assume the role of social planners, if some
positive or negative external eﬀects between proﬁts of diﬀerent ﬁrms exist. For example, if ﬁrm
A hampers proﬁts of ﬁrm B through the use of polluting technologies, it could be very well in
the interest of pension funds for ﬁrm A to switch to a clean production technology, even if the
value of ﬁrm A is lower after the switch. Monitoring activity in this regard would therefor also
include an environmental dimension. From a corporate governance viewpoint, it is not clear if
management of ﬁrm A should give in when approached by a pension fund asking to switch to a
clean technology. By doing so it would impair the interest of shareholders, who held only stocks
of ﬁrm A but none of B. Additionally, if these steps toward a cleaner technology could be under-
taken continuously, management would face a dilemma: How should the conﬂicting goals of proﬁt
maximization and reduction of pollution be weighted? In this respect, it has to be noted, that
Tirole (2001) mentions a clear lack of mission as one of three problems for the implementation of
the stakeholder society.
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Footnotes
1 Incumbent management does not necessarily have to be incompetent or corrupt, but may
simply be stubborn. As Jensen (1988) describes, “managers often have troubles abandoning
strategies, they have spent years designing and implementing, even when these strategies
no longer contribute to the organizations survival”, p.23.
2 According to Tirole (2001), institutional investors in the US mainly act as short-term stock
market players, responsible for 80 percent of trading volume, with an average holding period
of stocks of only 1.9 years. On the other hand, they are only rarely represented on the board.
3 See Pension Markets in Focus, OECD 2013, p.7 Table A1, p.35 and own calculations.
4 CalPERS for example alone manages USD 237 billion (June 30, 2012, Quelle: Comprehen-
sive Annual Financial Report) for more than 1.1 million active and inactive members and
for more than 550 000 retirees and other beneﬁciaries. Pension Markets in Focus, OECD
2013, box 1, p. 17.
5 The operating eﬃciency of pension funds is measured by the ratio of total operating costs in
relation to assets managed. Total operating costs include all cost of administration (handling
of payments of active members and employers and paying beneﬁts to retirees) as well as
costs associated with asset management. In Canada administrative costs alone amount
to about 0.4% of total assets. In the Netherlands total operating costs amount to 0.2%.
Probably due to scale eﬀects, the Netherlands enjoys such low costs: In the Netherlands
pension fund assets are managed by only 393 pension funds (2011), whereas the number
of pension funds in Switzerland is 1681 (2012) and in Canada 7870 pension funds (2012)
fulﬁll this task. Even more widely dispersed are pension fund assets in the United Kingdom,
where 65 523 pension funds existed in 2008. This is the last data point that OECD can
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provide for the number of pension funds in the United Kingdom, and number of pension
funds for the United States or Japan are not provided by OECD, probably due to data
problems in the respective countries.
6 Solutions to overcome the free-rider problem have been proposed by Grossman and Hart
(1980), Shleifer and Vishny (1986).
7 The term ”institutional activism” subsumes (includes) ”shareholder activism” (conﬂict be-
tween managers and shareholders) and ”social activism” (potential conﬂict between port-
folio or pension fund managers and investors or contributors).
8 This assumption is owed to the observation that even big pension funds like CalPERS hold
only between 0.5 and 2 percent of a company (see discussion in the Introduction).
9 A detailed description of the algorithm and an example for a MatLab-solution routine
is shown in the Appendix. Dixit and Olson (2000) yield numerical solutions through the
inversion of the incomplete β-function. Our method minimizes numerical eﬀort and is exact
up to 1 · 10−9.
10 We assume a linear cost function without further loss of generality. Convex cost functions
would just alter the quantitative results.
11 Alternatively, we could assume that all the pension funds willing to form a coalition have to
coordinate themselves on their own which would imply coordination costs of size εM
2−M
2 .
Hence, the endogenous probabilities of coalition formation we derive below are upward
biased. The qualitative results of the model, however, remain unaﬀected.
12 Hermes manages about BP 26 billion assets for clients directly. Additionally, the Hermes
Equity Ownership Service (EOS) serves 35 globally investing clients, pension funds and
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other institutional investors, by oﬀering intelligent voting for 10 000 companies worldwide.
In order to pursue these monitoring activities Hermes employs around 30 specialists, of
which many are Ex CEO, Corporate Governance experts or Investment bankers. The 35
clients of Hermes EOS are all big institutional investors, which together are responsible for
the investment of BP 115 billion worldwide (source: http://www.hermes.co.uk).
13 Ethos was founded in 1997 by two pension funds from Geneva, Switzerland. Since moni-
toring was too costly and in order to gain more voting power, Ethos quickly opened up its
services to other pension funds. The public pension fund of the City of Zurich was one of
the ﬁrst to join the Ethos coalition. Nowadays more than 140 pension funds and founda-
tions have joined Ethos foundation, which owns the corporation Ethos Services AG. The
main services of Ethos Services AG are proxy analysis and reports about Swiss companies
together with voting recommendations and administrative support at the general assembly.
The charge for the proxy analysis service for the 20 biggest Swiss companies, which usually
are included in the Swiss Market Index (SMI), amounts to 0.001% of the assets the speciﬁc
pension fund holds in Swiss equities (source: http://www.ethosfund.ch/).
14 In the last years, for example, the general assemblies of Novartis had very often controversial
issues concerning remuneration of managers. Proxy advisors such as Ethos, International
Shareholder Services (ISS) and others made recommendations. At the general assembly of
2012, the attendance rate was only 53% of total share capital (according to the website of
Ethos). Of these 53% stockholders, not free-riding on the actions of other stockholders, as-
suming that the outcome would result in an economically eﬃcient Novartis, the distribution
was as follows: 8% came from shareholders present, proxy votes delegated to Novartis and
represented by Novartis were 20% and stocks represented by independent proxy advisors
such as Ethos were 72% (or 38% of all outstanding shares).
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15 What is relevant for a successful formation of a coalition is the cumulative probability, Q,
of drawing at least M IN’s in N independent Bernoulli trials, which is determined by
Q = 1−∑M−1n=0 N !n!(N−n)!Pn(1− P )N−n.
16 Since we only have one period of trading in our model, we assume that the pension fund
appears only once at the market and discloses the amount of shares it wants to sell. A
more detailed description of optimal trading and measuring of transaction costs is given in
Grinold and Kahn (1999). In order to minimize market impact, large investors typically
spread the trade over more periods while also having to consider opportunity costs.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Hazard Rate
Suppose the random variable T has a continuous probability distribution f(t), such that the
cumulative probability distribution is
F (t) =
∫ t
0
f(s)ds = Prob(T  t). (13)
The probability that the spell is of length at least t is given by the survival function
S(t) = 1− F (t) = Prob(T  t). (14)
The hazard rate answers the following question. Given that the the spell has lasted until t, what
is the probability that it will end in the next short time interval, Δt? Hence
lim
Δt→0
=
F (t+Δt)− F (t)
ΔtS(t)
=
∂F (t)
∂t
S(t)
=
f(t)
S(t)
. (15)
→ The hazard rate is the rate at which spells are completed after duration t, given that they
lasted until time t.
Binomial Distribution
The probability of observing up to M successes in N independent Bernoulli-trials is given by
B = B(M |N,P ) =
M∑
n=0
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
N
n
⎞
⎟⎟⎠Pn(1− P )N−n. (16)
The probability of observing more than M successes in N independent Bernoulli-trials is given
by
1−B(M |N,P ). (17)
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Hence, the hazard rate of the binomial distribution is given by
lim
ΔP→0
=
B(P +ΔP )−B
ΔP (1−B) =
∂B
∂P
(1−B) =
b
B
. (18)
→ The hazard rate of the binomial distribution answers the question, how big is the variation
of the probability that there won’t be more than M successes in N independent Benoulli-trials
after an inﬁnitesimal small increase in the probability of success in one trial, P , given that the
probability of drawing more than M for ﬁxed P and N is 1−B(M |N,P ).
6.2 Solution Algorithm
1. Define a vector i with nk elements, with nk not smaller than 100.
2. Span up a vector of probabilities P = {P{i=1} = 0, ..., P{i=nk} = 1}.
3. Calculate x{i} = 1− b{i}∑M
n=0
N!
n!(N−n)!P
n
{i}(1−P{i})N−n
.
4. 1− b∑M
n=0
N!
n!(N−n)!P
n(1−P )N−n is declining in P . Find that P{i} for which x{i} <
C
VM and set
i = max and i− 1 = min.
5. Define a new vector with
P{max}−P{min}
nk−1 entries from P{min,i=1} to P{max,i=nk}.
6. Go back to Step 3 until CVM − x{max} < tol, with tol = 1 10−j and j ≥ 9.
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6.3 MatLab- solution routine
06.04.06 14:14 C:\Programme\MATLAB704\work\dixitolsonnum.m 1 of 1
function dixitolsonnum
clc
N
M
nk=200
tol
P=0:1/nk
C=9.99/M
i
while i<nk+1 
   x=1-factorial(N)/(factorial(M)*factorial(N-M))*P(i)^M*(1-P(i))^(N-M)/(binocdf(M,N,P
(i)))
   %x = 1 - binopdf(M,N,P(i))/(binocdf(M,N,P(i)))
   if (x<=C) 
       P(i)
       max=i
       i=nk+1
   else
       i=i+1
   end
end
x
di=C-x
while di>tol
Pu=P(max-1)
Po=P(max)
step = (Po-Pu)/(nk-1)
P=Pu:step:Po
i
while i<nk+1 
   x=1-factorial(N)/(factorial(M)*factorial(N-M))*P(i)^M*(1-P(i))^(N-M)/(binocdf(M,N,P
(i)))
    %x = 1 - binopdf(M,N,P(i))/(binocdf(M,N,P(i)))
   if (x<=C) 
       max=i
       i=nk
   else
       i=i
   end
end
P(max)
x
di=C-x
end
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αi M
C
Π1M
P Q
(a) Baseline scenario
N = 200; O = 0.001; ε = 0.00004; αcrit = 0.1
0.002 50 0.03 0.2915 0.9164
0.0015 67 0.0366 0.3727 0.8805
0.001 100 0.05 0.5286 0.8113
(b) αcrit = 0.15
0.002 75 0.0267 0.4207 0.9170
0.0015 100 0.0333 0.5401 0.8865
0.001 150 0.0467 0.7792 0.8600
(c) Higher coordination costs: ε = 0.0004
0.002 50 0.21 0.2243 0.2137
0.0015 67 0.27 0.2797 0.0499
0.001 100 0.41 0.3796 0
(d) Lower beneﬁts: C
0.2Π1M
0.002 50 0.15 0.2416 0.4172
0.0015 67 0.1831 0.3101 0.2447
0.001 100 0.25 0.4433 0.0619
Table 1: Endogenous probability P for choosing to join the coalition and the cumulative proba-
bility, Q, that at least M pension funds form a coalition.
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Exit option (reference scenario see Table 1(a)): ΠS = 1.05; k = 0.001
αi M s
∗
(
ΠS−Π1
Π1
)
+ C
Π1M
P Q
(a) m = 1.25 which implies s∗ = 0.8654
0.002 50 0.0733 0.2684 0.7452
0.0015 67 0.0799 0.3490 0.6853
0.001 100 0.0933 0.5060 0.5954
(b) m = 1.05 which implies s∗ = 0.9742
0.002 50 0.0787 0.2661 0.7218
0.0015 67 0.0853 0.3465 0.6593
0.001 100 0.0987 0.5036 0.5680
(c) like (b), i.e. m = 1.05 and s∗ = 0.9742, but lower losses: C
0.2Π1M
0.002 50 0.1987 0.2274 0.2463
0.0015 67 0.2318 0.2914 0.1171
0.001 100 0.2987 0.4246 0.0189
Table 2: Exit option with diﬀerent market impact m.
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Figure 1: Determination of the endogenous probability, P (see Eq.(5)). Solid line: hazard rate
of M successes as a function of P for given N . Dashed line: Cumulative probability, Q, that a
coalition of size M will form as a function of P for given N .
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Figure 2: Graphical presentation of the Baseline Scenario (see Table 1(a)).
37
0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.70
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
QM=50 QM=67 QM=100
M = 100M = 67M = 50
φαi = (
C
0.2Π1M
)αi ;N = 200
P0.002
Q0.001
P0.001
φ0.001
φ0.0015
P0.0015
φ0.002
Q0.0015
Q0.002
Figure 3: Graphical presentation of the eﬀects of a reduction in expected losses if the coalition
fails to form (see Table 1(d)).
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